Early 2000s, also known as the "Terrorism Age", led to the militarization of a foreign policy with a military approach, or in other words, a foreign policy based on militarism in the US.
Considering the threat posed by Al Qaeda as a non-state actor to US national security and interests in the world, and some governments were hosting and supporting the group.
Thus, following the 9/11 events, US decided to pursue an aggressive foreign policy managed and led by the Army.
Grounded on the policy, some regimes, especially the fundamentalist governments that had paved the way for the establishment and operations of radical and terrorist groups, had to be jettisoned, and new democratic governments had to be established in alignment with the American Order.
Unlike in the past, where the US state-building policy was mostly focused on establishing institutions, promoting freedom, and building alliances and cooperation with countries, which was providing the ground for formation of democratic governments. This time, US intervened through getting use of violence and direct military intervention that resulted in overthrowing the ruling regime that was against the American approach, and planning for the formation of a new government.
Idea of Defeating Terrorism
The principle and basis of US militaristic foreign policy was the idea of defeating terrorism and toppling fundamentalist regimes. Because American policymakers and strategists believed that, the existence of weak and incompetent governments in the Middle East and South Asia had led to the formation of extremist groups in these regions and had provided the facility for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda Network to have a safe life. Hence, some of these governments must be supported first in order to come out of the fragile and weak state, and a number of other regimes and governments must collapse, and new governments responsible and accountable for international security and peace shall become established instead.
In such kind of a foreign policy, regimes and groups that were flexible and were willing to cut ties with terrorist groups were not given considerable opportunity to negotiate and compromise, but rather repressive policies using military interventionist force were used against them. While the policy, sometimes, worked in Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term and led to the collapse of the Taliban regime and the Ba'ath Party in Iraq; however, over time, the remnants of the two ousted regimes overthrown by Washington rebounded and turned into a hindrance against implementation of US state-building policy in these two countries.
Given the priority of the war against terrorism in US foreign policy between 2001 and 2014, it can be argued in general that strategic ties and alliances between the US and its allies have fully taken on a military form. And, as for the status quo and intensification of conflicts and insecurity in Afghanistan, the view of Washington for the state-building in Afghanistan was also militarized. The US has debated that the only way out is for a new government to be established, with focus on the formation of a national armed force that can replace foreign troops and remove the threat existed inside Afghanistan defined as "insurgency" in US foreign policy. On the other hand, US policymakers and military generals have suggested that withdrawing Afghanistan in such conditions is a mistake, and thus, they have repeatedly advised US political leaders that withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan would further attack on the US and its interests in the region. Therefore, the new Afghanistan government must be strengthened and expand its sovereignty in the presence of the US troops.
Immature Experience of State-Building
We look at the state-building process in Taiwan as an immature experience. United States and Japan, as major contributors to the state-building process in that country, have sought to establish and strengthen state institutions in the face of threats from China and North Korea; however, the similar system was pursued in the Afghanistan state-building process. The role of Afghan government in the state-building process was neglected due to pursuing short term development projects aimed at attracting cooperation of local people in the battlefield and establishing stabilization and concentrating on the fight against terrorism. As of the second decade of US presence in Afghanistan, 82 percent of development aid, and the state-building process had been expended outside the Afghan government's budget, and via contracting companies. Thus, domestic managers and governments that funded the state-building process did not focus on the effectiveness of the state-building process. The lack of domestic capacity to manage the process and the US focus on combating terrorism and suppressing insurgency inside Afghanistan, had changed the course of state-building process from the structural process and turn it into a security-military process, as a result of which militaristic state-building became formed.
To ensure their physical security and political stability, governments in Afghanistan have always needed the help and cooperation of foreigners, especially the great powers and regional hegemonies, and have ruled as Rentier States. The US government stressed that in order to eradicate a permanent threat to the security of America and its allies; hence, a stable and responsible government for international peace and security shall become established in Afghanistan. However, efforts to establish such a state were not pursued by investing in civil institutions and strengthening development and economic institutions, but by seeking to establish such a state and democratic institutions in the presence of foreign troops and the continuation of the war. Therefore, the military lasted for years.
The US spent part of its budget and money on those areas of Afghanistan that had experienced the most insecurity. The aim was to put an end to xenophobia and create a spirit of cooperation in the state-building process, especially the formation of democratic institutions. A phenomenon that Afghans considered an imposed foreign phenomenon, and extremist groups simply used it as an excuse to recruit fighters from rural areas and illustrate their current war as a national resistance.
Taliban Resistance against State-Building Process
The state-building process and its sustainability requires provision of security and attainment of stability in the country, so that in the light of this security and stability, the state-building process, development and institutionalization can be carried out by the interventionist force. In addition, the government that is set to become established needs to strengthen its institutions to achieve self-sufficiency and turn the state-building process from the outside into a national process. What challenged the state-building process in Afghanistan and led to a security-military situation for many years was the Taliban resistance against the entire processes that began and continued to form government in Afghanistan. The Taliban stood up not only against foreign troops, but they also against any project or process initiated even by Afghans themselves but with the financial and political support of foreigners, and thus, challenged the state-building process. Continuation of this situation led the leadership of the new government in Afghanistan to conclude that the presence of foreign forces is a basic need to continue the state-building process. As in 2005, Afghan President Hamid Karzai (2003-2014) said, "If foreign forces did not have presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan government would not last for a month." And his successor, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (2014-2020), expressed the same view ten years later in 2016. These statements show the fragility of the state-building process and the need for the presence of foreign troops on the arena of the state-building process.
US Military-Security View Point of Afghanistan
The international military coalition, formed in 2001 under the leadership of America for the purpose to fight against terrorism, was comprised of more than 50 countries. Each of these countries contributed to Afghan state-building process based on its military commitment to the coalition and taking the number of their troops as well as their geographical location in Afghanistan into account. They were assigned to Afghanistan by the US as part of a military mission, and each of these countries were tasked to contribute in from provision of security to implementation of reconstruction projects, and from funding the local armed forces to state-building process in general in the area under their responsibility. Given that the component and the beginning of the state-building process in Afghanistan was a security-military event (9/11 incident) and given that the philosophy of the US presence in Afghanistan was to defeat of Al Qaeda and eliminating security-military threats against the US and its allies. Meanwhile, more attention was paid to the military dimension in the state-building process as well, and efforts were made to invest more in security-military institutions and organizations. On the other hand, the presence of terrorist groups, and continuation of war by these groups against the Afghan system and posing of threat to international security led to the extension of the military situation and even advancement of the state-building process with a military approach.
In the end, US military-security view point of Afghanistan and the implementation of the state-building process with a military approach led all three stages of state-building (attack, reconstruction, and stabilization) to become affected by the security-military situation and resulted in failure of US state-building policy in Afghanistan.